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Abstract 
 
 
Drawing on the 2007 and 2010 Swaziland Labor Force Surveys, this paper provides first 
systematic evidence on recent youth employment challenges in Swaziland, a small, land-
locked, middle-income country with one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Africa. 
The paper first documents the various labor market disadvantages faced by the Swazi youth, 
such as high unemployment and discouragement, and how they changed from 2007 to 2010. 
A multinomial logit regression analysis is then carried out to analyze the socio-economic 
drivers of the unfavorable youth labor market outcomes on the supply side. Since many of the 
factors that can unlock the employment potential of the Swazi youth are on the demand side 
of the labor market, the paper examines the barriers to job creation and youth 
entrepreneurship. It concludes with experiences of other countries that could inform design of 
more effective interventions for youth employment in Swaziland. 
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1. Introduction 
Swaziland, a small land-locked country in Southern Africa, seems to be caught in the middle income 
trap. Despite its favorable location, mild climate, and a relatively diversified production base, it has 
been one of the slowest growing economies in Africa for almost two decades. Even with ‘rising’ 
Africa, Swaziland’s average annual growth during 2000 – 2012 was a mere 2.3 percent – well below 
the 5.8 percent average posted by the continent. The country’s real GDP per capital is projected to 
decline in both 2013 and 2014 (African Development Bank et al., 2013).2  
 
Swaziland’s sluggish growth has been accompanied by high unemployment, poverty and inequality. 
The country’s first two (2007 and 2010) labor force surveys revealed unemployment rate of 26.3 and 
26.8 percent of the labor force, respectively – some of the highest rates even among Africa’s middle 
income countries.3 Marked differences across subgroups have emerged, with youth, women, and less 
educated workers disproportionally impacted. The employment challenge has been amplified by high 
rates of discouragement, especially among young women and the rural population.   
 
The 2011 ‘Poverty Maps’ (Government of Swaziland, 2011) have highlighted the negative links 
between poverty and employment and raised concern about the implications of low employment on 
poverty and people’s welfare. With the majority of Swazis relying mainly on income from formal 
sector employment for their livelihoods, it is not surprising that in 2010 the nation-wide poverty 
encompassed 63 percent of the population. Poverty has been linked to weak social indicators, 
exacerbated by a high prevalence of HIV (UNDP, 2013). 
 
The labor market situation has worsened in 2011 and 2012 by the delayed impact of the global 
financial crisis, transmitted to the economy mostly through the collapse of revenues from the Southern 
Africa Custom Union (SACU). Because of the subsequent liquidity crunch, the government froze 
public sector hiring and accumulated arrears to the small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The crisis 
was transferred to households mostly through cuts in jobs, wages and work hours, and firm closures in 
the private sector (UN Swaziland, 2012).  
 
Against this background Swaziland faces a major youth employment challenge. This paper documents 
the labor market disadvantages faced by Swazi youth. It also analyzes changes in these disadvantages 
over time and discusses options for addressing them. At about 50 percent of the labor force, youth 
unemployment in Swaziland is high and unsustainable, as the 2011 experiences in North Africa 
showed. With the underdeveloped private sector and the lack of productive jobs, structural 
transformation is among key policy priorities.4 The government has undertaken some steps to address 
the youth employment situation, but is yet to develop a comprehensive approach to tackle it.  
 
2 Felipe (2012) classified Swaziland among 22 countries currently caught in the low middle-income trap. Swaziland and 
Africa’s growth during 2000 – 2012 was calculated based on data in the AfDB database.  
3 Throughout the paper, data are un-weighted and reflect the actual information in the surveys, with the urban population 
somewhat overrepresented relative to its actual share in the total population. The re-weighted unemployment is thus slightly 
higher, reaching about 28 percent of the labor force in both 2007 and 2010 according to the Swaziland Ministry of Labor.  
4 In low income countries the main employment issue is working poverty. In both low and middle income countries sources 
of youth employment need to come mostly on structural transformation (Page 2012).    
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Our paper contributes to the literature on labor markets in Southern Africa by providing first systematic 
evidence on the youth labor market in Swaziland, a country with particularly high youth unemployment 
rates. By utilizing the first two (2007 and 2010) Swaziland Labor Force Surveys and shedding light on 
the trends, scale, and forms of youth labor market disadvantages, the paper provides evidence for 
policymaking.5 It also illustrates the first-round impact of the global financial crisis on the labor market 
of a small, open, land-locked economy. The paper can be particularly relevant for other small middle-
income countries in Southern Africa that aim to reach inclusive growth in the midst of fluctuating 
SACU revenues, high unemployment, income inequality, and HIV rates (Jauch, 2011).  
 
Besides Southern Africa, the paper contributes to the ongoing more general analysis and policy debates 
on youth employment in Africa. First, reliable labor market data from African countries are still 
relatively scarce, and until recently none was available for Swaziland. Second, with the global financial 
crisis turning into a job crisis and impacting youth disproportionally, youth employment became a key 
global policy issue (AfDB et al. 2012, ILO, 2012; World Bank, 2013a). In Africa, where youth 
employment is a long-standing challenge, policymakers have put even higher priority on creating jobs 
for their youth and on entrepreneurship.6 Our paper adds to these debates insights from a small land-
locked country with one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Africa and globally.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines main features of the Swazi labor market, with 
focus on youth. Section III analyzes factors behind the youth employment challenge in Swaziland, 
while Section IV discusses policy options. Section V concludes.  
 
I. Key Features of the Swazi Labor Market  
 
a. Overall Situation 
 
This section outlines the main features of the Swazi labor market based on the country’s Labor Force 
Surveys 2007 and 2010, including: (i) high unemployment and its long duration; (ii) declining 
employment and labor force participation rates; and (iii) unemployment impacting disproportionally 
youth, women, and the less educated.  
 
(i) High overall unemployment, with long duration 
 
Based on the labor force surveys’ data, Swaziland’s overall unemployment rate reached 26.3 percent 
and 26.8 percent of the labor force in 2007 and 2010, respectively. At those times, the country’s 
unemployment rate, which rose markedly since the mid-1990s, was among the highest in Africa’s 
middle income countries. In the context of Southern Africa, high unemployment is not unique to 
Swaziland, but prevails also in the other middle income countries in the region (Table 1). 
 
Another notable feature of the labor market in Swaziland is the long unemployment and/or 
underemployment duration. For example, about 80 percent of respondents in the 2007 Swaziland Labor 
5 The methodology for the 2007 and 2010 Swaziland labor force surveys followed the ILO standards. The sample consisted 
of over 3,000 households and more than 13,000 individuals.  
6 An initiative on ‘Job Creation for Youth in Africa’ has been launched between the African Union, Economic Commission 
for Africa, African Development Bank and the International Labour Organization.  
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Force Survey indicated that they were available for work for over a year, and more than half of 
respondents were available for more than two years.  
 
Table 1. Unemployment and Labor Force Participation in Selected Countries 
    Unemployment rate Participation 
rate Country  Year Total Male Female 
(% of the labor force) 
Botswana 2006 17.6 15.3 19.9 76.6 
Lesotho 1999 27.3 21.5 33.1 65.8 
Namibia 2004 21.9 19.3 25.0 64.0 
Swaziland 2010 26.3 22.7 30.0 49.3 
South Africa 2008 22.9 20.0 26.3 52.0 
Source: AfDB et al., 2012 and SLFS 2010. 
  
(ii) Declining employment and labor force participation rates 
 
Even though the official unemployment rate changed only marginally between 2007 and 2010, the 
labor market situation deteriorated and employment (which encompasses both the formal and informal 
sector) fell.7 In fact, employment rates decreased in all major age categories, and markedly in some age 
groups (above 35 years) and among men (Figure 1).  
 
The seemingly stable unemployment rate thus masked a decline in labor force participation. Indeed, if 
the 2010 labor force participation stayed at the 2007 level (53.4 percent of working age population 
rather than 49.3 percent), the unemployment rate would reach 33.2 percent of the labor force rather 
than 26.3 percent. Moreover, if all discouraged workers were included in the labor force, the 2010 
unemployment rate would rise further to 37 percent.  
 
(iii) Unemployment falls disproportionally on several groups  
 
Unemployment in Swaziland is especially widespread among: (i) women, (ii) the less educated, and 
(iii) youth. This section points out challenges faced by these groups.  
 
(1) Women 
 
In absolute terms women fare worse than men in the Swazi labor market. Women were more affected 
by unemployment and had lower labor force participation than men in both 2007 and 2010. However, 
men were more impacted by the first round effect of the global financial crisis through withdrawal from 
the labor force and lower employment rates (Table 2).8  
 
  
7 The deterioration was in part because of the negative impacts of the global financial crisis on selected sectors (e.g., 
manufacturing). At least 3,000 workers lost jobs in the textile sector alone in 2009 (SACU, 2011).  
8 Kangoye and Brixiova (2013) elaborate on scope and the drivers of the gender gap in the Swazi labor market.   
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Figure 1. Swaziland: Labor market outcomes in 2007 and 2010, by age and gender 
1a. Ages 15 – 24 (in percent)        1b. Ages 25 – 34 (in percent) 
  
 
1c. Ages 35 years + (in percent)     1d. All ages, 15 years + (in percent) 
  
 
1e. Labor force participation (% of population) 1f. Unemployment (2010, % of labor force) 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2007 and 2010 Swaziland Integrated Labor Force Surveys.  1/ The youth is 
defined as population aged 15 – 24 years, while adult population are people aged 25 years and above.  
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Table 2.  Swaziland: Labor force participation, employment and unemployment, by gender 
  Total Men Women 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Unemployment (% of LF) 26.8 26.3 24.0 22.7 30.3 30.0 
Employment (% of pop.) 39.0 36.4 46.4 42.4 32.3 31.2 
Labor Force Participation (% of pop.) 53.4 49.3 61.0 54.8 46.6 44.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2007 and 2010 SLFS.  
 
Data divided by age groups reveal that the gender unemployment gap is most pronounced among the 
25 -- 44 year group, with the unemployment rates of women being almost one third higher than the rate 
of men.9 As in other African countries, women’s labor force participation is below that of men across 
most age categories (Figures 1e and 1f). 
 
(2) The less educated 
 
Unemployment has been disproportionally concentrated among the less educated segments of the 
population (e.g., people with primary or no education). While in 2007 unemployment rate for people 
with tertiary education was 8.1 percent, it reached 32.5 percent for those with primary education or 
less. Having some secondary education is critical – people with primary education or less accounted for 
more than half of the unemployed among youth and about half among adults (Figure 2). Moreover, the 
high unemployment rate for high school graduates points to a steep return to tertiary education. 
 
Figure 2. Swaziland: Unemployment by Education, Youth and Adults (2007) 
 
2a. Unemployment by education, youth  2b. Unemployment by education, adults 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2007 Swaziland Labor Force Survey.  
  
(3) Youth 
 
At 52.7 percent of the labor force in 2007, youth unemployment was alarmingly high and among the 
highest in Africa, including in the SACU countries (Figure 3). The labor market situation deteriorated 
9 At the same time, unemployment rate for women over 55 years is lower than for their male counterparts, even though 
women’s labor force participation gap this age group is smaller than for the younger cohorts. 
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further between 2007 and 2010: while the official unemployment slightly declined (to 49.4 percent), 
both employment rate and the labor force participations of youth also dropped (Figure 1a). In fact, if 
the youth labor force participation remained at the 2007 level, the 2010 youth unemployment rate 
would amount to 55.1 percent of the labor force. Further, if all discouraged young people were in the 
labor force and searching, the youth unemployment would exceed 60 percent in both 2007 and 2010.  
 
In 2010, youth accounted for 37.7 percent of all unemployed, while people aged 25 – 34 years 
constituted another 37 percent. The bulk of unemployed was among the youth aged 20 – 24 years, 
constituting more than 30 percent of all unemployed. Of concern is also the declining employment rate 
in this age group during 2007 and 2010. With these rates and trends, youth unemployment ceases to be 
an economic issue only. As the 2011 experiences from North Africa showed, if unaddressed, the low 
and declining youth employment could lead to social and political unrests.  
 
Figure 3. Youth and Adult Unemployment Rates in Selected African Countries 
 
Source: Based on SLFS (2007) and AfDB et al. (2012). Note: Countries other than Swaziland were included based on data 
availability in the ILO KILM, 7th Edition. The unemployment rates are in % of the labor force. 
 
b. Understanding youth labor market disadvantages 
 
The sections below document the labor market disadvantages faced by Swazi youth. A range of 
indicators highlight the type of disadvantages and more vulnerable youth sub-groups. 
 
(i) Youth disadvantage as a lack of jobs 
 
Unlike in Africa’s low income countries where most young people belong to “working poor”, 
unemployment is an important challenge in Swaziland. In 2007 and 2010 surveys, about half of the 
labor force aged 15 – 24 were unemployed, while the youth/adult unemployment ratio in the country 
was 2.7 and 2.4 n 2007 and 2010, respectively. Despite Swaziland’s small size, substantial differences 
in these ratios existed among regions and administrative areas. Nevertheless, unemployment rate was 
higher for youth than for the adults in all but two administrative areas (Figure 4).   
 
Unemployment impacted youth disproportionally in the urban areas, where the youth unemployment 
rate was more than triple the adult rate (Table 3 and Table I, Annex I). The unemployed urban youth 
accounted for 45 percent of unemployed, with almost one out of five young people being unemployed.  
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Figure 4. Swaziland: Unemployment, by Inkhundla, (2007, % of labor force) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2007 and 2010 SLFS. Note: Inkhundla is an administrative area. Given the 
small sample size per area, these figures are indicative, but reflect the overall trend.  
 
Table 3. Swaziland: Youth Unemployment, 2007 and 2010 
2007 All By gender By area 
    Male Female Urban Rural 
Youth Unemployment Rate (% of LF) 52.7 50.3 55.2 46.7 58 
Adult Unemployment Rate ( % of LF) 19.5 17.4 22.1 14.3 32 
Ratio of Youth to Adult Unempl. Rate 2.7 2.9 2.5 3.3 1.8 
Youth Unemployment Ratio (% of pop.) 16.8 16.3 17.2 18.9 15.6 
Youth LF Participation Rate (% of pop.) 31.9 32.6 31.2 40.4 26.9 
2010 All By gender By area 
    Male Female Urban Rural 
Youth Unemployment Rate ( % of LF) 49.5 48.4 50.3 35.5 61.7 
Adult Unemployment Rate ( % of LF) 20.0 16.9 23.5 12.3 29.6 
Ratio of Youth to Adult Unempl. Rate 2.5 2.9 2.1 2.9 2.1 
Youth Unemployment Ratio (% of pop.) 14.0 13.3 14.7 13.4 14.3 
Youth LF Participation Rate (% of pop.) 28.4 27.4 29.2 35.5 23.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2007 and 2010 Labor Force Surveys. Note: Young people are defined as ages 15 – 
24, adults as ages 25+.  
 
Youth with tertiary education are almost seven times more likely to be unemployed than their adult 
counterparts. The notably higher unemployment rates for youth than for adults point to mismatches 
between the skills of the graduates and those demanded by the market, raising questions about 
relevance of tertiary education (Marope, 2010).10  
 
(ii) Youth disadvantage as discouragement 
 
Long unemployment spells prevail among youth almost as much as among adults. In 2007, three 
quarters of young unemployed Swazis were available for employment for over one year (Swaziland 
Ministry of Labor, 2008). Because of the long job search, significant shares of young people, especially 
10 In Tunisia and other North African countries, the unemployment pool contained a disproportionate share of the educated 
youth (Stampini and Verdier-Chouchane, 2011).  
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Y
ou
th
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
  
Adult unemployment rate  
8 
 
                                                 
women and the rural population, have been discouraged from job search. Hence while open youth 
unemployment is a key challenge in the urban areas, discouragement is widespread in rural settings. 
Moreover, the gap between ‘relaxed’ youth unemployment rates in the rural and urban areas markedly 
widened from about 14 percentage points of the labor force in 2007 to 25 percentage points in 2010 
(Table 4).  
 
Extended periods of idleness can lead to ‘scarring’, that is the impairment of employment and income 
prospects through low wages, underemployment, and low-pay-no-pay cycles as well as the loss of 
human capital. Social exclusion is another negative consequence of youth idleness. The young people 
miss out on critical life-skill building experiences such as applying their knowledge, developing a sense 
of own abilities  and contributing meaningfully to society (Scarpetta et al., 2010; Khumalo, 2011). 
 
Table 4. Swaziland: Youth Discouragement, 2007 and 2010 
    Gender Area 
  Total Male Female Urban Rural 
2007 Relaxed' unemployment rate (% of modified LF) 
   Total (15 + ) 36.6 30.8 42.7 27.5 45.3 
  Youth (15 - 24)  63.2 59.2 66.8 55.7 69.2 
     Teenagers (15 - 19) 67.4 64.0 70.1 66.7 67.8 
     Young Adults (20 - 24) 61.7 57.5 65.4 52.3 69.7 
  Adults (25 + ) 27.9 22.7 33.7 19.4 36.5 
2010 Relaxed' unemployment rate (% of modified LF) 
Total (15 + ) 37.0 30.2 43.6 22.8 51.0 
  Youth (15 - 24)  61.0 57.6 63.6 45.6 72.5 
     Teenagers (15 - 19) 66.3 64.5 67.6 51.0 75.6 
     Young Adults (20 - 24) 59.7 55.9 62.6 44.4 71.6 
  Adults (25 + ) 30.4 23.6 37.3 17.5 44.0 
Source: Authors calculations based on the 2007 and 2010 SLFS. Note: ‘relaxed’ definition of unemployment captures 
discouraged workers, both in the unemployment pool and in the labor force.  
 
(iii) Youth disadvantage as holding jobs of lower quality  
 
The quality of employment – in terms of job security and wages – is another dimension where the 
Swazi youth are disadvantaged relative to adults. As common elsewhere, on average young people in 
Swaziland also hold less secure jobs than adults. The lack of employment with contracts among youth 
implies that youth are not protected by the labor code and/or against health risk and the old age (Kolev 
and Saget, 2005). While more than half of the employed adults are covered by social security, less than 
one third of youth has such coverage (Figure 5).  
 
Young people are less likely than adults to work in high paying segments of the economy such as 
public sector or business services. In 2007, only 5 percent of youth were employed in the public sector 
in contrast to 24 percent of adults (Table 5). Within the private sector, young people were employed 
more in the less paying fields such as retail trade or agriculture. This, combined with their experience, 
resulted in much lower incomes than those earned by adults. Specifically, only 9.2% of youth have 
monthly salary above 1,500 emalangeni (about 150 euros) relative to 485 of adults, pointing to a high 
prevalence of working poverty among youth, as in other countries (Guarcello et al., 2012).  
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Figure 5. Swaziland: Quality and Security of Employment, 2007, (% of employed) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2007 SLFS.  
 
Table 5. Sectoral distribution of employment, by age and gender  
  Youth Adults 
  Total Men Women Total Men Women 
(% of total employment in each category) 
Public Sector 5.1 5.7 4.4 23.9 23.2 24.9 
Private Sector, formal 76.3 79.8 72.7 56.9 64.9 46.2 
Private Sector, informal 13.8 9.5 18.2 17.3 11.1 25.4 
Domestic workers 4.9 5.0 4.7 2.0 0.8 3.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2007 SLFS. Note: Dependency ratio is people below 15 and above 64 years old 
relative to the working age population (15 – 64).  
 
II. Determinants of Youth Unemployment 
 
This section discusses both supply-side (e.g., demographic, social) and demand-side (e.g., private 
sector growth) drivers of youth unemployment, with a view to inform policies. 
 
a. Supply-side factors  
 
(i) Demographic trends 
 
In 2010, young people amounted to 43 percent of Swaziland working age population (Figure 6a). The 
share of youth in the population aged 15 years or above was higher not only than the average in 
Southern Africa, but also than in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and among the least developed countries 
world-wide.  
 
Due to the ongoing demographic transition the dependency ratio is projected to decline rapidly, 
presenting a potential demographic dividend (Figure 6b). Swaziland will reap this dividend only if its 
workers, including youth, have productive jobs. So far, a large portion of the country’s working age 
population, and especially youth, has been underutilized. 
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(ii) Socio-economic determinants of youth unemployment  
 
This Section examines some of the key socio-economic factors (e.g., age, gender, education) 
contributing to high youth unemployment. We study young adults (ages 20 – 29) since tertiary 
education and self-employment are relatively rare among teenagers (ages 15 – 19).  
 
Methodology 
 
Utilizing a multinomial logit model, the identification strategy can be written as follows: 
 
 
  
 
 
where τ stands for individuals; Emp. status is the outcome categorical variable indicating whether the 
individual has a wage employment in  the public sector, the formal private sector, the informal private 
sector, or is self-employed, inactive or unemployed. The vector of controls includes demographic 
characteristics such as gender and age, household-related characteristics such as the marital status and 
the individual’s responsibility in the household, proxies of mobility such as the geographical location 
(urban versus rural) and the length of stay in the area, and education variables. 
 
The gender variable (dummy taking the value 1 for women and 0 for men) captures any gender gap in 
the labor market. Age and Age2 test the sensitivity of the likelihood of the employment status depend on 
age. Marital status (proxied by a dummy variable - Single - taking the value of 1 the individual is single 
and 0 otherwise) and responsibility in the household (proxied by a dummy variable - Head - taking the 
value of 1 if the individual is a head of household and 0 otherwise) take into account the fact that 
household head and married people may have higher incentives work so as to secure an adequate 
income stream for the household. As people living in urban areas may have higher job opportunities in 
the formal private and public sectors, we include a dummy variable (Urban) taking the value of 1 if the 
individual lives in an urban area and 0 otherwise. Mobility (proxied by Stay, a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if the individual has been living in the area since birth and 0 otherwise) accounts for 
knowledge and network effects related to the duration of stay in the area. Lastly, we include as 
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regressors a set of education dummy variables (primary, secondary, tertiary) taking the value of 1 if the 
individual has achieved a primary, secondary and tertiary education, respectively. 
 
Unemployment is the reference state. The other states are employment in the public sector, the formal 
private sector, the informal private sector, inactivity, and self-employment. For each state, the 
estimated coefficients represent the likelihood of being in that state rather than in unemployment, given 
each independent variable such as age, gender, education, area and mobility. Results are in Table 6.11  
 
Results 
 
Education, both secondary and tertiary, raised young adults’ chances of working in the public sector 
relative to being unemployed in both 2007 and 2010. Tertiary education also reduced the likelihood of 
being inactive. Taken together with a small tertiary graduates in the country, the implications point to 
the need for an increase access. At the same time, the quality of education cannot be compromised. 
Recently evidence of skill mismatches has emerged, with the young educated job seekers not having 
skills demanded by employers’ (e.g., business, technical, ICT skills). This could be addressed through 
reforming the educational curricula and more efficient matching of graduates with vacancies. 
 
Age also improved chances of young adults having a formal wage employment, being inactive or self-
employed in 2010. Specifically, a higher age in the range 20-29 was associated with higher probability 
of being employed in the formal private sector or being self-employed, confirming that young people 
have difficulties finding jobs in the public sector. Since Age squared had a negative and significant 
coefficient for the formal private and self-employment status, there may be a turning point in the 
impact of age on the likelihood of working in the formal private sector or as self-employed. This 
suggests that after gaining experience in the private sector, young people are able to switch to the 
public sector which offers higher wages.  
 
Gender also played a role in the 2007 and 2010 labor market outcomes of young adults. Women were 
less likely to be employed in the formal public and private sector than unemployed. In contrast, they 
were more likely to be inactive and self-employed.  
 
Young adults in urban areas had higher chances to work in the formal private sector (both in 2007 and 
2010) or to be self-employed (in 2007) than rural youth. At the same time, urban location likelihood of 
being inactive rather than unemployed. In 2007, young urban residents were also less likely to work in 
the formal public sector rather than unemployed.  
 
Higher mobility (measured as whether an individual has lived in the area since birth or not) raised 
young adults’ chances of being employed in the public and private (formal and informal) sector rather 
than being unemployed in both 2007 and 2010. This is expected, since mobility is often linked with 
greater dynamism and desire to gain training and experience).  
11 One question in our regression model is whether the controls may be collinear, i.e. if there may be statistical 
dependencies among them. To address this concern, we use of variance inflation factor to identify multicollinearity, as in 
Wooldridge (2000). The results in the last column of Table 6 indicate that except for Age and Age2, all controls have VIF 
lower than 10, implying that multi-collinearity is not an issue in our regression analysis. The high collinearity of the Age 
variables was expected and is not a source of biased inference.  
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Table 6. Multinomial Logit Regressions, Ages 20 - 29 
2007 
  Public Private (formal) 
Private 
(informal) Inactive Self-employed VIF* 
Demographic characteristics   
Gender (1= female) -.17(.21) -.15(.12) .52(.51) .01(.57) .19(.19) 1.13 
Age  .56(.96) .21(.42) .97(1.67) .94(1.72) -.01(.65) 364.88 
Age squared   -.006(.019) -.002(.008) -.02(.03) -.02(.04) .003(.01) 364.67 
Household-related characteristics   
Single   -.06(.24) -.09(.14) .74(.78) -1.13(a)(.45) -1.13(a)(.20) 1.17 
Head   1.54(a)(.27) 1.57(a)(.17) .33(.82) 1.66(a)(.69) 1.81(a)(.25) 1.32 
Mobility and location   
Urban   -.56(a)(.22) .26(b)(.13) -1.06(.66) -1.72(a)(.72) -.20(.20) 1.4 
Lenght of stay   -.49(b)(.24) -.68(a)(.14) -1.64(a)(.67) -.11(.76) -.22(.21) 1.52 
Level of education    
Primary   -.06(.52) -.06(.19) .69(.77) 19.6(20.6) .17(.33) 6.48 
Secondary  1.06
(a)
(.45) -.15(.18) -.27(.77) 19.28(20.65) .32(.32) 6.72 
Tertiary  2.84
(a)
(.49) .19(.28) -43.33(a)(.68) 19.76(.61) .57(.44) 2.81 
Intercept   -12.67(13.31) -3.9(5.11) -15.69(20.76) -32.1(-) -3.08(8.02) - 
Pseudo R2   0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 - 
Obs   1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 - 
2010         
Demographic characteristics   
Gender (1= female)   -.34(c)(.21) -.44(a)(.14) .22(.17) .51(a)(.15) .42(b)(.21) 1.12 
Age  1.34(.86) .94
(b)
(.47) .05(.6) -.97(b)(.48) 1.43(b)(.75) 379.13 
Age squared   -.02(.02) -.02(b)(.009) -.0004(.02) .02(b)(.01) -.03(c)(.02) 379.27 
Household-related characteristics   
Single   -.45(b)(.23) -.095(.16) .46(b)(.23) -.51(a)(.16) -.76(a)(.21) 1.21 
Head   1.92(a)(.24) 1.24(a)(.18) 1.01(a)(.22) .39(c)(.24) 1.70(a)(.24) 1.29 
Mobility and location   
Urban   .24(.21) 1.04(a)(.14) .79(a)(.19) -.27(c)(.16) .76(a)(.21) 1.34 
Lenght of stay   -.41(c)(.23) -.84(a)(.15) -.54(a)(.2) -.16(.18) -.07(.22) 1.46 
Level of education    
Primary   -.37(.48) -.3(.19) -.2(.23) -.23(.2) -.42(.29) 1.81 
Secondary  .82
(b)
(.41) -.28(.18) -.85(a)(.23) -.39(b)(.19) -.61(.28) 1.93 
Tertiary  2.98
(a)
(.46) .38(.3) -1.05(b)(.5) -.25(.4) -.57(.49) 1.39 
Intercept   -20.95(b)(11) -12.99(5.77) -2.33(7.38) 11.92(b)(5.8) -20.6(a)(9.24) - 
Pseudo R2   0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 - 
Obs   2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 - 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (a) denotes significance at 1%, (b) at 5% and (c) at 10%. *VIF: Variance 
Inflation Factor values.  
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In sum, higher education, living in urban areas and being mobile increased employment chances of 
young people. Among young adults, women and very young people had lower probability of 
employment in the private sector relative to being unemployed, reiterating the need to pay special 
attention to these groups.  
 
b. Demand-side factors 
 
With Swaziland’s persistently low growth the main constraints to decent job creation reside mostly on 
the demand side of the labor market, even though supply side factors undoubtedly matter as well for 
youth employment outcomes. Due to weak business environment, private investment (as share of GDP) 
has been low even in comparison to other countries in the region (Table 7). It has received another 
setback in recent years with the deteriorating fiscal situation which has hampered both FDI inflows and 
SME activities (UN Swaziland, 2012). 
 
Table 7. The Size of the Private Sector: Swaziland and Other SACU Countries 
 Private investment Private Sector Credit 
 1990-2011 2000-2011 
 (% of GDP) 
Botswana 15.3 19.8 
Swaziland 9.9 19.2 
South Africa 13.0 139.3 
Namibia 14.4 46.4 
Lesotho 32.4 11.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from the WDI database.   
 
In 2013 Swaziland ranked #123 out of 185 countries on the Doing Business (World Bank, 2013). The 
country scored low in the ‘Starting a Business’ category (#165/185 countries), reflecting high start-up 
cost and lengthy procedures. The ‘Enforcing Contracts’ category (#174/185) also left room for 
significant improvement, especially in cutting number of days and procedures required. Relatively low 
rankings on ‘Registering Property’ (#129/185) and ‘Protecting Investors’ (128/185) also impede 
investment and SME start-ups, alongside trade barriers. Overall, in the past five years, Swaziland has 
shown only limited improvement in most reform categories measured by Doing Business reforms. 
 
In Africa the lack of structural transformation from low to high productive jobs is a key impediment to 
decent employment, including among youth (Page, 2012). This applies also to Swaziland. While the 
economy is diversified relative to other SSA countries, low value added activities (e.g., subsistence 
agriculture, trade) predominate in employment. In recent years, the oversized public sector kept hires at 
a minimum while the stagnating private sector could not absorb new labor force entrants.  
 
With high unemployment, questions arise to what extent labor market institutions have been driving 
this outcome. Even though these institutions are not particularly flexible in Swaziland when compared 
to small, fast growing economies, they fare well relative to other SACU countries (Table 8). Moreover, 
they are not a main obstacle to job creation, since they are usually enforced only partially.  
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Table 8. Labor Market Flexibility 1/ 
  
Pay relative 
to 
Productivity 
Flexibility of 
wage 
determination 
Labor - 
employer 
relations 
Hiring and 
Firing 
Practices 
Redundancy 
Cost 
(weeks) 
Professional 
Management 
 
Ranking (index), unless otherwise indicated 
Swaziland 132 (3.0) 106 (4.4) 85 (4.1) 111 (3.3) 8.7 74 (4.2) 
Global average 3.9 4.9 4.4 3.9 11.8 4.3 
SSA median 3.3 4.9 4.1 3.9 9.1 4.0 
Fast growing small economies 
       Estonia 7 (5.1) 6 (6.0) 34 (4.8) 28 (4.5) 4.3 25 (5.2) 
  Mauritius 74 (3.8) 107 (4.4) 43 (4.7) 82 (3.8) 6.3 60 (4.4) 
  Rwanda 46 (4.2) 38 (5.5) 30 (4.9) 43 (4.3) 8.7 37 (4.9) 
  Singapore 1 (5.5) 7 (6.0) 2 (6.1) 2 (5.8) 0.0 11 (5.9) 
Source: GCR 2011/2012. 1/Index scale is 1 – 7, with higher values indicating greater flexibility. Note: Pay relative to 
productivity – whether pay reflects productivity; flexibility of wage determination – wages are set (1) by centralized 
bargaining or (7) by individual companies; labor - employer relations are (1) confrontational or (7) cooperative; hiring and 
firing practices are (1) impeded by regulations or (7) flexibly determined; professional management -- senior management 
positions are determined by (1) merit or (7) connections. 
 
III. Policies Towards Youth Employment in Swaziland 
 
Tackling youth employment is a complex challenge that extends beyond labor market interventions and includes 
addressing macroeconomic management and performance; the infrastructure gap, low productivity; unclear regulations, 
including land ownership; and often political setting with leadership that prioritizes the issue (JICA, World Bank and 
African Development Bank, 2013). The interventions discussed below focus on labor market policies or related 
measures, leaving the other important aspects to further research.  
 
a. Policies towards creating jobs for youth 
 
The evidence of youth skills shortages and mismatches among young people with tertiary education has 
emerged. The educated youth often do not have the skills demanded by employers and/or are not aware 
where to find suitable jobs. Reforms of tertiary education, expansion of vocational and on-the-job 
training could over time address these shortages, while labor exchanges could reduce mismatches.  
 
Some issues need to be also tackled on the supply side of the labor market. Currently, with the public 
sector offering the best paid and most secure jobs, many recent graduates “get in line” for jobs in the 
public sector. Experience in the public sector is also viewed as entry into even better paid private 
industries, such as banking. To change relative attractiveness of the public sector and majority of 
private sector jobs, some regulation of the public wage bargaining process may be needed.  
 
With the stagnant public sector, the key bottleneck to youth employment has been an insufficient 
creation of productive jobs in the private sector. A vibrant private sector that would provide high 
paying and productive jobs (as is already the case in the banking sector, for example) is the key to a 
lasting reduction in youth unemployment. The role of an enabling regulatory framework thus cannot be 
emphasized enough. The government has recognized the need to improve business environment and in 
the early 2012 re-launched Investor Road Map in an effort to cut red tape and attract investment.  
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Besides fundamentals such as macroeconomic stability, business environment, human capital, and the 
rule of law (Anyanwu, 2013 and World Bank, 2013c), sectoral polices can stimulate youth 
employment. The ICT industry, which currently lags behind other SSA countries, could generate jobs 
for youth. With their ability to adapt to changes and innovate, young people could drive tech-
entrepreneurship (Lisk and Dixon-Fyle, 2013). For example, the implementation of the e-government 
strategy could create new job opportunities for youth that would unlock their creative potential. Youth 
are also well-positioned to lead development of innovative e- and m-services in initiatives such as e-
wallet, e-health or m-banking (AfDB et al, 2012). The barriers to entering the ICT sectors impact youth 
more though, due to their greater aptitude for innovation, and should be eased (Table 9). 
 
ICT can also improve labor market outcomes indirectly, by raising productivity. Swaziland has recently 
taken steps to increase productivity in agriculture through training young farmers and rural 
entrepreneurs in ICT. Still ICT is not an employment intensive sector and other sectors, such as 
manufacturing, productive services and tourism will need to be the backbone of employment. Given 
that many young people work in the informal sector, the government may like to remove constraints on 
raising the sector’s productivity, as suggested also for other African countries (JICA et al., 2013).  
 
Recently entrepreneurship has gained increased attention of Swazi policymakers as a venue to tackle 
the youth employment challenge. This attention rests on two main factors. First, in Swaziland, where 
the public sector is oversized and the external demand dampened by subdues growth of South Africa, 
stimulating domestic private sector through entrepreneurship provides a viable alternative. Second, 
besides building livelihoods, entrepreneurship can help young people develop their identity and 
integrate into the society by offering a sense of ‘meaning’ and ‘belonging’. These benefits have become 
increasingly important with weakening family and community structures (White and Kenyon, 2000). 
 
Table 9. Swaziland: key actual & considered policy instruments towards youth employment  
1. Moving youth closer to 
jobs (supply side) 
Implementation 
Status  
2. Generating jobs for youth 
(demand side) 
Implementation 
Status  
a. Impacting expectations 
 
a. Improve business environment 
 - Contain wage in the public 
sector partly 
 - especially in strategic sectors (ICT) 
- improve access to credit 
progress very 
limited 
- Limit size of the public sector partly b. Support youth entrepreneurship 
 - Develop the private sector partly - with training and funding partly 
b. Affecting quality of labor 
 
c. Make youth employment attractive  
 
- Reform educational system considered 
- Provide subsidies to wages of young 
people discussed 
- Expand vocational training considered 
    
c. Raising mobility 
   - Build affordable housing  considered 
  - Improve infrastructure partly 
  - Support to job search very limited   
Source: Authors, based on discussions with Swazi authorities and representatives of the private sector.  
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b. Policies supporting young entrepreneurs 
 
The Government has adopted measures to support youth entrepreneurship. In 2009 it established the 
Youth Enterprise Fund (YEF) to fund youth start-ups.12 Access to credit is an obstacle for young 
entrepreneurs in Swaziland who often lack collateral experience and are thus considered ‘high risk’ by 
the commercial banks (UN Swaziland, 2013). The YEF helps address these constraints. In 2010, the 
fund distributed 580,000 euros to about 800 young entrepreneurs. In 2011, the Fund distributed another 
200,000 euros to 200 entrepreneurs.13  However, the low repayment rates underscored the importance 
of strengthened proposal evaluations and better monitoring of the use of disbursed funds. The lack of 
skills and experience of young entrepreneurs pointed also to the need to combine funds with training. 
  
While the YEF has been a step in the right direction, it would need to be markedly scaled up and 
restructured to make a dent in youth employment. Swaziland is yet to develop a comprehensive youth 
employment and entrepreneurship policy that would integrate its young people into the labor market 
and help reach inclusive growth. In that regard, international experiences with initiatives targeting 
youth entrepreneurship, and what has worked, can inform policy design in Swaziland:  
 
 The study of high potential young entrepreneurs in Europe emphasized: (i) the importance of 
selectivity so that youth with best projects are supported; (ii) preference for more intense 
support per entrepreneur rather than spreading resources thinly; and (iii) integrated support 
packages rather than a single instrument (OECD, 2012).  
 
 Designing and implementing the integrated service packages rather than isolated measures is 
also a key lesson from entrepreneurship programs in Sub-Saharan Africa that targeted 
vulnerable youth (Puerto, 2007). Another lesson is that in cases where the government provides 
start-up subsidies, it should have a credible exit strategy. Training schemes tend to be more 
effective when administered by the private sector which understands entrepreneurs’ needs, 
while the government incentives are important for the uptake of these programs.14 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
This paper provided first systematic evidence on the youth employment challenge in Swaziland, based 
on the country’s 2007 and 2010 labor force surveys as well as the authors’ discussions with 
representatives of the private sector and policymakers. The paper documented the types of labor market 
disadvantages impacting youth and how they changed due to the first round impacts of the global 
financial crisis. It then applied multivariate analysis to uncover socio-economic factors (e.g., education, 
age, gender, location and mobility) driving youth labor outcomes. Since the key obstacles to addressing 
youth employment challenge in Swaziland are on the demand side of the labor market, we looked into 
12 Among NGOs, TechnoServe, has supported Swazi SMEs, including those owned by youth while the Junior Achievement 
Swaziland (JASD) has been developing entrepreneurial skills among Swazi high school students. Credits constraints and the 
lack of skills have been recognized as obstacle to entrepreneurship across Africa (Baliamoune et al., 2011 and Brixiová, 
2010). These obstacles impact more heavily youth than adults. 
13 No collateral is required. Young entrepreneurs have up to 3 months to start their business upon receiving the funds; they 
have to repay loans within 24 months. Interest rate is about 10%, well below the commercial rates. 
14 The messages are elaborated in Johanson and Van Adams (2004), Schoof (2006), Puerto (2007), and others. 
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the main impediments to private sector development as well as lessons from the recent initiatives to 
stimulate youth employment and entrepreneurship in Swaziland and other countries. 
 
Key policy messages for fostering dynamic youth entrepreneurship – in Swaziland and other middle 
income countries in Southern Africa -- are that an enabling business environment is only one, even 
though necessary, aspect. The government’s pro-active support for entrepreneurial training and start-up 
capital is also needed. Regarding the latter, the Swaziland’s experience underscored the importance of 
careful selection of projects for funding, and of monitoring the use of funds after disbursement. 
International good practices suggest that government interventions should target the most viable 
projects, extend greater financial support to a fewer high-potential entrepreneurs rather than spread 
resources thinly, and provide complementary packages of services instead of a single measure.  
 
The topic of effective government policies encouraging youth entrepreneurship in Africa is relatively 
understudied and gives opportunities for high impact policy-oriented research. Further studies in this 
area could explore the role of African youth in technology adoption and innovation as well as different 
policies that the governments can adopt towards high potential and vulnerable youth groups.  
 
The youth employment challenge is complex and successful solutions will need to draw on various 
stakeholders and multi-disciplinary approaches. In this paper, we have focused mostly on labor market 
and entrepreneurship-related policies and thus left the broader issues of an enabling youth employment 
framework (e.g., macroeconomic conditions, the rule of law, political leadership) as well as youth 
empowerment and integration into the society for further research. 
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Annex I – Youth and Adult Unemployment 
Table 1, Annex I. Youth and adult unemployment ratios, by gender and age sub-groups 
  Men Women SE of difference Significance 
Total unemployment 0.2397 0.3029 0.0122 *** 
Adult unemployment (25 +) 0.1740 0.2270 0.0124 *** 
Youth unemployment (15 - 24) 0.5010 0.5520 0.0290 * 
Teenagers (15 - 19) 0.4930 0.5490 0.0592 
 Young Adults 1 (20 - 24) 0.5034 0.5526 0.0333 
 Young Adults 2 (25 - 29) 0.2760 0.3480 0.0316 ** 
  Youth Adults     
Total unemployment 0.5270 0.1950 0.0157 *** 
Male unemployment 0.5010 0.1740 0.0222 *** 
Female unemployment 0.5520 0.2270 0.0224 *** 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Swaziland Labor Force Survey 2007. Note: Labor force is normalized to 1, 
unemployment is the ratio of the age- relevant labor force.   
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